The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Anti-Trust Acts by Launer, Seymour & McGinn, William F.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 20 




The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Anti-Trust Acts 
Seymour Launer 
William F. McGinn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Launer, Seymour and McGinn, William F. (1945) "The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Anti-Trust 
Acts," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 20 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss1/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE
ANTI-TRUST AcTs
The extent of the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion with respect to freight rates has recently developed into a
major issue by reason of the acceptance by the United States Supreme
Court of jurisdiction in the Georgia rate case.' Objection to ac-
ceptance of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court was based upon the
argument that it would require the Court to usurp the rate-making
regulatory functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission.2 To
determine the validity of this contention three fundamental questions
require analysis:
1. Does the Sherman Anti-Trust Act apply to such combina-
tions to fix rates as Georgia claims exist in the transportation field?
2. Is the United States Supreme Court permitted to take juris-
diction of the case without violation of Section 16 of the Clayton
Anti-Trust Act?
3. Do other jurisdictional factors permit the State of Georgia
the use of the United States Supreme Court as a forum?
Unless all three of these questions are answered in the affirma-
tive, the Supreme Court's right to take jurisdiction is open to serious
objection.
I
Congress has delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, a quasi-judicial body, control over freight rate-making. Like
the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission
is an arm of Congress and is "an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute
in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed. . . ." 3
IState of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. et al., - U. S. -, 89 L. ed.
758 (1945). The complaint in this case was brought directly to the Supreme
Court by Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia. He charged that alleged rate dis-
crimination was in violation of the federal anti-trust laws and had prevented the
South from developing industrially. The court by a five-to-four decision decided
to take jurisdiction of this case. Associate Justice William 0. Douglas wrote the
majority opinion. Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone dissented, joined by Asso-
ciate Justices Owen J. Roberts, Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson,
who were of the opinion that acceptance of jurisdiction could not fail but to
bring chaos into the field of interstate rate-making.
2For the extent of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
with reference to rate-making and regulatory functions, see Illinois Central
R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S. 441, 454, 51 L. ed. 1128
(1907).
3Rathbun v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628, 79 L. ed. 1611 (1935);
alsa see I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission; An Appraisal
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 965, 947-954.
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It is a non-political expert body, with continuity in office, high tradi-
tions of service, and impartial judgment. It has been enlarged from
its original five members, when the first Act to Regulate Commerce 4
was passed on February 4, 1887, into a body now comprising eleven
members. Its functions have increased as new legislation was passed
to meet the problems presented by the mushroom growth of our
transportation system which paralleled the economic and industrial
expansion of a vigorous young America. The authority of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission is determined by the various acts to
regulate commerce beginning with the Act of 1887 5 and amended by
subsequent legislation, including the recent Motor Carrier Act 6 and
Regulation of Freight Forwarders.7  With the foregoing additions
the Act now consists of a preamble setting forth the transportation
policy of our country, and of four sections which provide for all
phases of transportation except Air Transport (Part 1-Rail, Part
2-Motor, Part 3-Water, Part 4-Freight Forwarders).
In accordance with the statutory authority granted to it, the
Interstate Commerce Commission has developed a complete organiza-
tion for handling litigation pertaining to the general rate structure,
as well as for the examination of rights and routes of common
carriers.8  Scrutiny of the Act, however, reveals a gap in the au-
thority of the Interstate Commerce Commission; it has no control
over a rate-fixing conspiracy which results in restraint of trade and
straint of trade, for this is the province of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act 9 and therefore was never delegated to the Interstate Commerce
Cormission.10 Congress has granted to the Commission the power
to lift the ban of the anti-trust laws in mergers or consolidations, 11
and the carriers are authorized by the statutes 12 to make agreements
for joint rates and with respect to such rates the Commission has
jurisdiction. However, the Commission has apparently no control
over carr~nr activities resulting in unreasonable combinations in re-
commerce between the states.
The power delegated the Interstate Commerce Commission by
Congress in the rate-construction field is practically exclusive. Its
determinations may only be appealed to the federal courts in specific
424 STAT. 379, 384, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-27 (1887), as amended.
5 Ibi.
6 MOTOR CARRIER ACT, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-327 (1935).
7 FREIGHT FORWARDER ACT, 56 Stat 300, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1002
(1942).
SHiLLYER, McFARLAND, HILLYER, MANUAL OF PRACTICE AN7D PROCEDURE
BEFoRE I. C. C. (1945) 41-57.
9 SHERmAN ANTI-TRUST ACT, 26 Stat. 210, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1890).0 9Burchmore, Regulatory and Anti-Trust Statutes (May, 1944), Proc. Inst.
of Trans., N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. (Supp.) 91-103.
1 New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 77
L. ed. 138 (1932).
12 54 STAT. 900, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 (4), 6.
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instances 13 and even then there is a presumption that the rate ac-
cepted by the Commission is reasonable.14 A specific procedure and
practice ' 5 in the handling of rate matters has been developed by the
Commission. The primary source for rate initiation and promulga-
tion is the rate bureau '6 established by various conferences of carriers.
These rate bureaus formulate rates taking into consideration such
transportation factors as density of traffic, distance, value of com-
modity, and cubic content. Two types of rates are set up, Class rates
and Special Commodity rates. The latter differ from the former
in that they are adopted to accommodate large regular movements of
particular commodities (mostly bulk articles such as coal, cotton, oil,
grain) and do not appear in the Consolidated Freight Classification
but rather in special Commodity Tariffs. After these rates have been
formulated they are published and thirty days are alloted for the
public to protest or otherwise impeach their reasonableness. If there
is no valid opposition to their becoming effective they then are made
part of the general rate structure and appear in the regular tariffs.
Is HLLYm, McFARI.Ax, HILexR, supra; note 8, at 58, "The well-ascertained
law is that courts are without power to weigh the evidence introduced before
the Commission, or pass upon the soundness of the Commission's conclusions.
The only instances in which the courts will review findings of fact by the
Commission are where the Commission has acted arbitrarily or without evi-
dence to support its conclusions, or has transcended its constitutional or statu-
tory powers." See also Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283
U. S. 235, 75 L. ed. 999 (1931) ; cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Del.
L. & W. R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 55 L. ed. 448 (1911).
Cases brought to enforce, enjoin or set aside orders of the Commission are
governed by Title 28, §§ 41, 43, 44, 45a, 46, 47, 47a and 48 of the U. S. C. A.(except suits to collect awards of reparations, which may be filed in the ap-
propriate federal or state court pursuant to provisions of Section 16 of Inter-
state Commerce Act). Any party or parties in interest may appear in the
court case on their own motion and as of right. The District Court may in
appropriate circumstances grant (1) a temporary stay or suspension for not
more than 60 days upon a specific finding of "irreparable damage", (2) an
interlocutory injunction, (3) a permanent injunction. The order must be made
by a special three-judge court.
See North Dakota ex rel. Lemke v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 257
U. S. 485, 66 L. ed. 329 (1922) ; cf. Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
258 U. S. 158, 66 L. ed. 531 (1922).
14 Keogh v. Chicago N. W. Ry., 260 U. S. 156, 67 L. ed. 183 (1922), where
Justice Brandeis held that though a combination of carriers to fix reasonable
and non-discriminatory rates may be illegal under anti-trust acts nevertheless
shipper may not recover damages if the rates so fixed has been approved by
the Interstate Commerce Commission; that approval of rates by the Com-
mission establishes that they are reasonable and not discriminatory. Accord,
Louisville & N. Ry. v. United States, 245 U. S. 463, 466, 62 L. ed. 400 (1918)-
In a suit to set aside an order of the Commission where the evidence before
the Commission was conflicting and ample to sustain the findings, they are
conclusive.
15 General Rules of Practice before Interstate Commerce Commission,
49 U. S. C. A. § 17-Rail; § 304(a)-Motor; § 904(a)-Water; § 1003(a)-
Forwarder.
26 In re Trans-Continental Freight Bureau, 77 I. C. C. 252, 279.
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The entire country has been divided into certain freight rate
territories called Official, Southern, and Western. It is with respect
to shipments moving from one territory to another that high cost
combination rates rather than low through rates have become the
practice. It is the contention of Governor Arnall of Georgia that the
total effect of these inter-territorial rates has been discrimination be-
tween sections to the detriment of the New Industrial South and
the benefit of the North (Official territory)Y17 The Interstate Com-
merce Commission has taken cognizance of this matter in the past,
and in the case of State of Albama v. New York Central the Com-
mission required application of the so-called destination theory of
rate-making upon certain commodities moving from Southern terri-
tory into Official territory. In other words, it required through rates
from South to North, based upon the level of the rates within the
Official territory. But this decision dealt only with a few commodities
and in general higher rates predominated for inter-territorial move-
ments of freight than for shipments within freight territories.
If such rate discrimination resulted from concerted action by
combinations of carriers, the matter would be subject to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act which prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was enacted three years after the
Interstate Commerce Act 1 and has been supplemented by the Clay-
ton Act 2 0 and the Federal Trade Commission Act 2 1 Although noth-
ing in the Act indicates that it is to apply to railroads, the Sherman
Act has been construed by the courts as applicable although super-
seded whenever the Interstate Commerce Act affords a remedy in
express terms.22 Thus it has been held that railroad rate agreements
are subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 2 3 and that a rate agree-
ment and association of all principal railroads of Official territory was
unreasonable 24 under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Though the
railroads and other transport agencies are subject to the general terms
of the Anti-Trust Acts, certain exemptions and limitations in par-
ticular features are found in these Acts vesting power in the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.25 In general, however, it may be said
17 WIPRUD, JUsTIcE IN TRANSPORTATION (1945).
18235 I. C. C. 255, 237 I. C. C. 515; also see In re Livestock to and from
the South, 253 I. C. C. 241.
19 INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT; 54 Stat. 898, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-27, 201-327(1940).
20 38 STAT. 734, 15 U. S. C. A. § 217 (1914).
21 FEDERAL TRADE CommissIoN AcT, 38 Stat. 717, 718, 15 U. S. C. A.
§§ 41-47 (1914).
22United States v. Union Pac. P. R., 226 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 124 (1912).23 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed.
1007 (1897).
24 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259 (1898).




that though rate violations are subject to the Interstate Commerce
Commission,26 nothing is said about anti-trust violations in the Inter-
state Commerce Act and therefore in such instances the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act would apply.27
II
Whether the United States Supreme Court is permitted to takejurisdiction of the Georgia case without a violation of Section 16 of
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act 28 is our next point of inquiry. It is
worthy to note that this section specifically exempts common carriers
from suits in equity seeking injunctive relief under the Clayton Act
unless such suit is instituted by the United States. In three pertinent
cases the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress did
not intend to supplement the remedies provided to a shipper or
carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act with triple damages or
injunctive relief afforded under the anti-trust laws.29
When the Clayton Act was adopted in 1914, the Commission had
already been given power to fix, and regulate rates by the Hepburn
Act s0 and the Mann-Ellins Act.L3 1 Congress, realizing that indis-
criminate suits for injunctions under the anti-trust laws would sub-
stitute the many district courts for the Commission-the single rate-
making authority-decided to adopt Section 16 of the Clayton Act
to avoid confusion and conflict in this field. Thus when Congress by
Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorized private suitors to seek re-
26 INMasTAT Co mucE Aer, 54 Stat. 898, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq.
(1940), Part 1, § 13-Rail, Part 2, §§ 204d, 216e, 218b-Water, Part 3, § 307-
Motor Carrier, Part 4, §§ 406, 407, 408, 409-Forwarders.
27 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra, at 758.
28 38 STAT. 737, 15 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1914). Injunctive relief for private
parties; exception:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
anti-trust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened
conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under
the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond
against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that
the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate 'a preliminary injunc-
tion may issue; Provided, That nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-al,
22-27 of this title shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or
association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive
relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of chapters 1 and
8 of Title 49, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision,
or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
29United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U. S. 474,
76 L. ed. 403 (1932) ; Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 288
U. S. 469, 77 L. ed. 899 (1933) ;,Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 297 U. S. 500, 80 L. ed. 827 (1936).
30 34 STAT. 584, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1908).
3136 STAT. 539, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1-9) (1910).
1945]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
lief by injunction under the anti-trust laws, it was at pains to bar
such suits against carriers with respect to matters within control of
the Commission. Section 16 was formulated to preclude such break-
down of the uniform rate structure established by the Commission
as would inevitably result from the maintenance under the Sherman
Act of numerous individual suits like the Georgia rate case affecting
rates which Congress had left within the Commission's exclusive con-
trol in the first instance. Thus the manifest purpose of Section 16 32
was to preclude such suits except by the Federal Government in
order to prevent judicial interference with or pre-judgment of the
lawfulness of matters which Congress had placed within the juris-
diction of the administrative agency.33
III
Finally, we inquire whether there were other factors, jurisdic-
tional or equitable, permitting consideration of the Georgia rate case
by the United States Supreme Court. It is undoubtedly true that
the United States Constitution provides that in all cases in which a
"state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction" 34 and prima facie this would seem to give Georgia the right
to resort directly to our highest tribunal. But under the acids of
legal analysis this right vanishes into nothingness. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Mellon 3 5 is authority for the rule that even a state
must prove that a justiciable issue exists before it can claim the
Supreme Court as a forum. In the Georgia rate case while the ma-
jority opinion held that such an issue existed, the minority argued
with a great deal of persuasiveness that the right of the State of
Georgia to sue by reason of its being a shipper of materials and a
proprietor of several railroads adversely affected by the present inter-
territorial rate structure, was merely a makeshift issue to give the
Supreme Court jurisdiction. Georgia's claim of right to institute pro-
ceedings as parens patriae is a departure from the doctrine enunciated
in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon.8 The court in that
case speaking through Justice Sutherland pointed out that, "it cannot
be conceded that a state, as parens patriae, may institute judicial
proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation
of the statutes thereof. . . .In that field it is the United States,
and not the state which represents them as parens patriae, when such
representation becomes appropriate. . ." .
Furthermore, there were other procedural remedies open to
32United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U. S. 474,
76 L. ed. 408 (1932).
33 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra.
34 U. S. CONST., Art III § 2, cl. 2.
35 262 U. S. 447, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1922).




Georgia which might have been exhausted before appeal to the
Supreme Court, for Georgia pursued this cause as a litigant pleading
for equitable relief. The Interstate Commerce Commission had pend-
ing before it in Docket 28300 the entire subject of class rates east
of the Rocky Mountains. Georgia appeared in that case and the
chairman of its Public Service Commission who testified therein,
asked that the Commission prescribe uniform class rates within that
area. When the Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the case the
Commission had not rendered its decision and until such decision
was rendered adverse to the contentions of Georgia, that state had
not exhausted its administrative remedies. Thereafter Georgia could
have filed an appeal with the district court 38 and only upon a denial
of its claim by that tribunal should the action have been carried to
the Supreme Court. From the standpoint of practical procedure it
would seem far better to have tried the case before a district court
rather than compel an already overburdened Supreme Court to ap-
point a Special Master to hear the case and then review the Master's
findings and conclusions.
Conclusions
1. Control of certain monopolistic practices was never given
to the Interstate Commerce Commission so up until now it could
only recommend but not effectuate vital changes in the existing rate
structure.
2. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act would therefore apply to
such rate combinations in restraint of trade as did not come within
the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3. However, Section 16 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and
equitable principles inhibit such suit as was brought by Georgia di-
rectly to the United States Supreme Court. Resort by Georgia to
a district court or to the Interstate Commerce Commission would
have been in order, or the United States itself could bring such suit
under the Anti-Trust Acts.
4. The Interstate Commerce Commission itself has already
made extensive studies of the question of inter-territorial rates and
noted need for changes. In fact Docket Nos. 28300 and 28310 deal
with the very problem under discussion.3 9
5. The Interstate Commerce Commission has now acted to
equalize the rates 40 and if the tightening of control over rate bureaus
38 See note 11 supra.
39 12 I. C. C. P. Journal 1015--Important Recent Decision by Commission;
also see Chattanooga Packet Co. v. I. C. R Co., 33 I. C. C. 384, 392; SouthernClass Rate Investigation, 100 I. C. C. 513, 663.40 N. Y. Times, May 27, 1945, Special Feature Section, p. 10, col. 1, Freight
Rates Pattern Change for the Nation.
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proceeds as projected by the Bulwinkle Bill 41 and the Interstate
Commerce Commission itself, there is no need of any injunctive ac-
tion by the Supreme Court or any further concern by bodies other
than Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission. 42
6. The pyramiding of regulatory controls and duplication of
investigations is poor administration and worse economy. Consid-
eration should be given to enlargement of control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission over monopolistic practices in rate promul-
gation, removing this matter from the sphere of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.
7. Finally, reduction of political pressure on the Interstate
Commerce Commission by politicians and other pressure groups is
desirable so that it will be able to continue to do the excellent work




THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE COMMON
LAW OF WAR
One of the most significant events in human history is at present
taking place in Nuernberg, Germany. Here, for the first time, the
nations of the earth have united to take legal action against those
individuals who, it is alleged, have broken the most primary rules
and laws of human society. At Nuernberg for the first time, the
nations of this planet are applying internationally those principles of
law enforcement which for centuries have been applied on a national
scale. But just as every forward step in human progress has been
met with opposition, so the international war criminal trials at
Nuernberg have met with opposition.
The most frequent criticism hurled at these trials is that they
are applying newly created law and that this type of procedure is
without legal basis or precedent. Carrying on from there, these
1 H.R. 2536-To meet the criticism of the private nature of these rate
bureaus the Bulwinkle Bill provides for adequate regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission of the publishing of rates. The House Commerce
Committee has recommended also that the Interstate Commerce Commission
be given authorization to require reports from and inspection of the records
of rate bureaus.
42A. H. Feller, Administrative Justice, 27 Survey Graphic 494, "No one
asks the court to relax its vigilance over administrative agencies; but it must
proceed with caution, to intervene only where essential rights are transgressed,
and not permit general principles to impede effective enforcement of the law."
[ VOL. 20
